Foreign Direct Investment, Governance and Inclusive Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by Ofori, Isaac K. & Asonngu, Simplice A.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign Direct Investment, Governance
and Inclusive Growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Ofori, Isaac K. and Asonngu, Simplice A.




MPRA Paper No. 108178, posted 07 Jun 2021 11:05 UTC















Isaac K. Ofori 
Department of Economics, 
University of Insubria, 
Via Monte Generoso, 71, 21100, VA, Varese, Italy. 
E-mails: isaac.ofori1@ucc.edu.gh;  




Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P.O Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon 























Foreign Direct Investment, Governance and Inclusive Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 








Motivated by the projected rebound of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) following the implementation of the AfCFTA and the finalization of the Africa 
Investment Protocol, we examine how FDI modulates the effects of various governance 
dynamics on inclusive growth in SSA. We do this by testing two hypotheses first, whether 
unconditionally FDI and various governance indicators (rule of law, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, governance effectiveness, political stability, and voice and accountability) 
foster inclusive growth in SSA; and second, whether these governance dynamics engender 
positive synergy with FDI on inclusive growth in SSA. Using data from the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators and the World Development Indicators for the period 1990–
2020, we employ several fixed effects, random effects, and the system GMM estimators for 
the analysis. First, we find that FDI and all our governance dynamics are significant inclusive 
growth enhancers in SSA. Second, though FDI amplifies the effects of all our governance 
dynamics on inclusive growth in SSA, governance effectiveness, voice and accountability, 
and political stability are keys. Policy recommendations are provided. 
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Even before the unprecedented tumbling of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) into recession in 2020 
was the agenda to spur inclusive growth in the sub-region. Despite gains in terms of reduction 
in extreme poverty levels in SSA from 1990 to 2015, income inequality and unemployment 
are still rising. Of particular concern is the observation by Bergstrom (2020) and World Bank 
(2020) that the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has inflicted poverty and inequality setbacks 
in the world’s most unequal regions like the SSA and South Asia. This has rekindled the 
debate on how policymakers interested in the SSA agenda can foster and sustain shared 
prosperity. One key factor that SSA countries have identified as a means for spurring 
inclusive growth is economic integration, evidenced by the coming into force of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019. The optimism with economic integration is 
that it can generate durable and equitable wealth through technological transfer, innovation 
diffusion, employment, macroeconomic stability, and industrialization (Obeng et al. 2021; 
Adeleye et al. 2020; Asongu and Odhiambo 2020; Opoku et al. 2019; Sakyi et al. 2015; 
Tchamyou et al. 2019a). Moreover, with inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) set to 
rebound in 2022 following a slump in 2019 and 2020 (UNCTAD 2020) as a result of the 
geopolitical fragility of the region and COVID-19, expectations are rising. Inter alia, the 
fulcrum on which economic integration and other potential inclusive growth drivers rest and 
evolve is good governance. Indeed, the words of the former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, labelling good governance as ‘perhaps the most single important factor in 
eradicating poverty and promoting development’ underscores the relevance of quality 
political, economic and institutional setting in inclusive growth. Good governance is 
imperative for building inclusive growth through the enhancement of conducive political and 
socioeconomic climate that promotes accountability, fair redistribution, and social cohesion 
(see, UNDP 2017; OECD 2016, 2014; World Bank2013; Stiglitz, 2012). 
 Though gains have been chalked, long-standing hydra-headed problems of 
sociopolitical unrest, corruption, and economic mismanagement still linger in SSA 
(Adegboye et al. 2020; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016). Examining the linkages between 
governance and economic integration has thus become imperative in particular considering 
the region’s unprecedented trade pact and ambitious Agenda 20631. For instance, for 
inclusive growth to be enhanced, sound political governance is required to set the tone for 
peaceful coexistence, socioeconomic transformation and social cohesion (Asongu and 
                                               
1 Established in 2015, the African Agenda 2063 forms the continent’s resolve for achieving inclusive and 
sustainable development.  
Nwachukwu 2016; Khan 2012; Kaufmann and Aart 2002; White and Anderson 2001). 
Prudent economic governance is also necessary to formulate, drive and sustain economic 
transformation—one that puts the private sector and the masses in general at the forefront of 
investment, innovation and wealth accumulation (Pritchett and Werker 2012). Particularly, 
strong institutional governance is also imperative for spearheading accountability, social 
inclusion, protection of public purse, and to level the playing field for all manner of people to 
have a chance of descent living and contribute to national development (Ivanyna and Salerno 
2021; Doumbia 2020; Kaufmann et al. 2005; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Zhuang et al. 2010). In 
another breath, governance matters also for attracting, integrating and sustaining FDI into 
recipient economies. Though FDI can contribute to the region’s quest for inclusive growth, 
governance remains a worthwhile mechanism and the ‘lubricant to turn the turbines on’. 
Particularly, strong economic governance is required to reduce investment risk while strong 
legal frameworks are needed to safeguard and guarantee investment returns. Further, for the 
inclusive growth-inducing effect of FDI to be realized, governance effectiveness can be 
crucial not only for building friendly climate for sustaining foreign investors but also for 
fostering social inclusion and redistribution. Despite these FDI-governance linkages, the 
lacuna in the literature on SSA is that empirical works exploring the extent to which FDI 
modulates the effect of governance on inclusive growth in SSA are hard to find. This is the 
basis of our contribution to knowledge where we examine how various governance 
dynamics2— economic governance (composed of governance effectiveness, and regulatory 
quality); political governance (comprising political stability, and voice and accountability); 
and institutional governance (rule of law, and control of corruption) are mediated by FDI to 
influence inclusive growth in SSA.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section is dedicated to a review 
of the literature on the linkages between FDI, governance and inclusive growth. Section 3 
also presents the data and methodological foundation of the paper. The results and 
discussions are presented in section 4 while chapter 5 concludes with some policy 
implications. 
 
2.0 The theoretical link between FDI, governance and inclusive growth 
The theoretical exposition on the effect of economic integration/globalisation on inclusive 
growth is viewed from two perspectives. First is the indubitable consensus that in countries 
                                               
2Our focus on the various aspects of governance is from policy sense. 
where there is abundant labour, trade, of which FDI is a key component in contemporary 
cross-border relations, shared income growth can be apparent. The theoretical underpinnings 
of this stem from the Ohlin (1933), Samuelson (1939), the theories of globalization and 
modernization, and the Bhagwati hypothesis that FDI contributes to socioeconomic 
development through the augmentation of recipient countries’ productive capacity, global 
value chain participation, job creation, technological transfer and foreign exchange (see, 
Obeng et al. 2021; Sakyi and Egyir 2017; Reyes 2001; Bhagwati 1973). Second is the 
intuition that FDI can widen the income distribution gap due to new technologies, automation 
and associated skill set mismatch (e.g., Corak 2013; Krugman 2008; IMF 2007), and rent-
seeking, crowding out/floundering of domestic firms, and macroeconomic fluctuations 
(Alvaredo et al. 2013). It is in this context that IMF (2016), OCED (2014), World Bank 
(2013), and UNDP (2011) reckon that unless appropriate political, institutional and economic 
frameworks are built, the inclusive growth-effect of FDI/globalisation will prove elusive. 
Thus, good governance is essential not only for attracting FDI but for its sustenance, 
equitable distribution of gains, and economic transformation. On the basis of the foregoing 
theoretical connections between FDI, governance and inclusive growth, we test two main 
hypotheses— (1) whether FDI and governance (decomposed into political stability, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability, and 
governance effectiveness) foster inclusive growth in SSA, and (2) whether these 6 
governance indicators engender positive synergy with FDI on inclusive growth in SSA.  
 
2.1 The FDI-governance-inclusive growth nexus 
Despite the much-emphasized dark sides of FDI, information gleaned from UNCTAD (2017; 
2019) indicate that the recent economic development of Africa has been at the backdrop of 
significant FDI inflows3. Indeed, FDI inflow to SSA has been remarkable in the last two 
decades—an increase from a modest US$18 billion in 2004 to US$98 billion in 2013 though 
this value fell to US$54 billion in 2015 (UNCTAD2016). Though overall, FDI took a 11 per 
cent nose dive in 2020 to US$28 billion from 2019 levels, countries such as Nigeria, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda and Mozambique are tipped to recover quickly as top FDI 
destinations in SSA (UNCTAD 2020). In a setting where capital/savings accumulation is 
inadequate but the population is youthful and innovative, infrastructure is being developed, 
and untapped natural resources/raw materials abound, FDI can be a game changer in fostering 
                                               
3Empirical evidence is found in Asamoah et al.(2019), Opoku et al.(2019) and Sakyiet al.(2015). 
shared prosperity. The optimism with FDI centres on the observation byUNCTAD (2013) 
that, compared to other regions of the world, FDI inflows to SSA remained remarkably high 
since the turn of the Millennium and even after the global financial crisis of 2008/09 (see, 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Trend of FDI Inflow (%GDP) Across Regions, 1990 – 2020 
Source: Authors’ construct (2021) 
 
 
Compared to regions like South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the 
gains of SSA as we show in Figure 1 are largely attributed to fact that in 2006, countries in 
the region adopted 57 strategies of which 49 targeted FDI. And with FDI inflow to the region 
set to rebound in 2022 following the implementation of the AfCFTA and finalization of its 
Investment Protocol, the grounds are fertile for SSA to pursue growth trajectories that 
possibly defeat the Kuznets hypothesis. The commitment on the part of African leaders to 
this effect is captured in the Africa Agenda 2063 dubbed, ‘The Africa We Want’. Out of the 
seven aspirations enshrined in Agenda 2063, three4 are devoted to good governance while 
two5 are dedicated to inclusive and sustainable development. It is an Agenda that feeds into 
the absolute definition of inclusive growth (i.e., growth that is beneficial to the poor) (see, 
Ravallion and Chen 2004); and the relative lens of inclusive growth (i.e., growth in incomes 
of the poor relative to the rest of the population) (see, IMF 2011; Ali and Son 2007). A more 
comprehensive definition is seen in Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) and Anand et al. (2013) 
who reckon that inclusive growth encompasses both the absolute and relative perspectives of 
growth. All this boils down to good governance—one that FDI can complement to address 
the region’s inequality of opportunities, income inequality, and inequality of wealth. Though 
a number of countries in the SSA sub-region (see e.g., Burundi, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau and 
Congo DR) lag behind with respect to the World Governance measuring rod of Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), the general trend as we show in Figure 2 is one that is 
encouraging. 
                                               
4(i) An integrated continent, united from a political perspective, within the remit of Pan-Africanism ideals and 
on the vision of the African Renaissance;(ii) An Africa of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, justice 
and respect for human rights; and (iii) A peaceful and safe Africa. 
5 (i) A prosperous Africa driven by inclusive growth and sustainable development, and (ii) An Africa as a 
united, resilient, strong and influential global partner and actor. 
 
 
Figure 2: Within Country Governance Performance(Average) In SSA, 1996 – 2020 
Source: Authors’ construct (2021) 
Indeed, the graphical relationships between FDI and inclusive growth on the one hand (see, 
Figure A.1), and governance and inclusive growth on the other hand (see, Figure A.2) are 
positive, signifying their potential inclusive growth-inducing effect which we explore next. 
 
3.0 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study employs macro data spanning 1990 – 2020 for a sample of 42 SSA countries6 for 
the analysis. Data7 on the outcome variable, inclusive growth, are generated following the 
approach of Anand et al. (2013) (see calculation in the Supplementary Material: 
‘Measurement of Inclusive Growth by Anand et al. (2013)’). In the calculation of inclusive 
growth, the income growth variable is GDP per capita, and that of the income distribution is 
the Gini index. There are some missing observations in the latter, which we take care of using 
data from the Global Consumption and Income Project (Lahoti et al. 2016). We check the 
robustness of our estimates on our inclusive growth variable by calculating another measure 
of inclusive growth using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The approach, which we 
elaborate in Section 4.4 is based on the Asian Development Bank (2013) framework of 
inclusive growth. The independent variables of interest in this study are FDI and governance. 
While the latter is denoted by six (6)key indicatorsrule of law, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, governance effectiveness, political stability, and voice and accountability, 
the former is measured as the net inflow of foreign direct investment to SSA as a percentage 
of GDP. Some variables controlled for in the estimation are vulnerable employment, 
inflation, human capital, ICT access and financial development. The motivation for the 
selection of variables in the conditioning information set is discussed in what follows. 
 The choice of ‘vulnerable employment’ centres on the structure of the economies in 
our analysis while inflation also signifies the implication of macroeconomic stability 
characteristic of the economies under consideration (Ofori et al. 2021; Ofori et al. 2018). We 
include financial development as it forms the pivot on which the private sector evolves, 
expands and realizes innovative ideas (Peprah et al. 2019). Considering the crucial 
implication of digital infrastructure in the current information age, ICT access is also 
                                               
6Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo DR., Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
7Our panel is unbalanced. 
included in the estimation (Ofori and Asongu 2021). But for financial development and 
governance indicators, which are sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s Financial 
Development Index (Svirydzenka 2016) and the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2010; Tchamyou, 2021), respectively, all the variables are drawn from 
the Word Development Indicators (World Bank 2021). 
 
Table 1: Variables’ descriptions and sources 
Variables Descriptions Sources 
Inclusive Growth Income growth and distribution  Authors 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Gini index 
Financial development 
Net foreign direct inflow (%GDP) 
Gini income inequality coefficient 
Financial development index capturing the depth, 





GDP per capita  Real GDP divided by population WDI 
Inflation Consumer price index (2010=100) WDI 
Vulnerable employment  Total contributing family and own-account workers as a 
share of total employment 
WDI 
ICT access Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
Rule of law Rule of law perception estimate WGI 
Control of corruption Control of corruption perception estimate WGI 
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness perception estimate WGI 
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality perception estimate WGI 
Political stability Political stability perception estimate WGI 
Voice and accountability  Voice and accountability perception estimate  WGI 
Note: WDI is World Development Indicators; Findex is IMF’s Financial Development Index; GCIP is 
Global Consumption and Income Project; WGI is World Government Indicators. 
Source: Authors’ construct, 2021 
 
 3.2 Estimation strategy 
The study rests on the intuition that shared prosperity thrives on good governance, which 
requires stronger institutions, mechanisms and processes that level the playing field for the 
masses to benefit not only from globalization/economic integration but several facets of 
national development (OECD 2017; World Bank 2013; Asian Development Bank 2013; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; UNDP 2011; Kaufmann et al. 1999). The empirical strategy 
therefore focuses on the exploration of the conditional and unconditional pathways through 
which FDI and governance affect inclusive growth in SSA. We begin by specifying several 
bivariate models where the relationships between the variables of interest and inclusive 
growth are explored. Next, we specify a baseline model where only the control variables are 
estimated before introducing FDI and the various governance dynamics in the model. Finally, 
per our hypothesized joint effect of FDI and our governance indicators, a pairwise interaction 
between these variables is introduced but step wisely in the model. We specify our bivariate 
models as follows: 
 𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 𝜆0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡)                  (1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 𝜆0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡)      (2) 
 
We specify our baseline model as: 𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 𝜆0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡) +𝛿5𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿6𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       (3) 
 
Finally, we modify equation (3) to capture the conditional and unconditional effects of FDI 
and governance on inclusive growth as seen in (4): 
 𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 𝜑0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡) +𝛽5𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 × 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 +𝜖𝑖𝑡            (4) 
 
Where igrowth is inclusive growth; hci is human capital index; vul is vulnerable 
employment; inf is inflation; ict is ICT usage; and fin is financial development. Also, fdi is 
foreign direct investment; gov is our governance8 indicator for rule of law, control of 
corruption, regulatory quality, governance effectiveness, political stability, and voice and 
accountability; i is country; t is time; 𝒍𝒏 is the natural logarithm; 𝝁𝒊 is the country-specific 
effects; and 𝝐𝒊𝒕 is the idiosyncratic error term. A suspicion of endogeneity may be apparent 
due to: (1) the introduction of the lag of inclusive growth, and (2) the simultaneity between 
inclusive growth and governance, particularly, political stability. The endogeneity problem 
arises since 𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 depends on 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1, which depends on the country-specific impact𝜖𝑖. 
Given that the concern of endogeneity can bias corresponding estimates, the attendant 
concern is addressed by applying the system GMM technique9put forward by Arellano and 
Bover (1995). The net effects from the interaction term for FDI and governance in (4) is 
expressed as: 
 𝜕(𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ))𝜕(𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣)) = 𝛽7 + 𝛽9(𝑓𝑑𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        (5) 
 
                                               
8Our governance variables are introduced stepwisely in the model. 
9 In estimating our system GMM models, the instruments are the lags of the regressors for the difference 
equation and the first difference of the regressors for the level equation. 
where 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅ is the mean of foreign direct investment. 
 
4.0 Results and discussion 
4.1 Summary statistics 
In Table 2, the overview of our data is presented. The data shows an average GDP per capita 
of US$3819.61 for the subregion. Interestingly, the value of inclusive growth (shared 
prosperity) is a modest US$ 343.71, and as we show in Figure A.3, requires much effort to 
improve. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables, 1990 – 2020 
Variables   N   Mean   Std. Dev. Minimum  Maximum 
Inclusive growth 1,260 343.708 835.271 10.834 14647.05 
FDI 1,260 2.894 6.392 -28.624 103.337 
GDP per capita 1,260 3819.609 4401.845 0 29223.47 
Vulnerable employment 1,260 70.927 22.867 8.826 94.759 
Inflation 1,260 58.382 46.466 0 410.94 
Human capital 1,260 .394 .073 0 .678 
ICT access 1,260 2.178 4.855 0 34.273 
Financial development 1,260 .124 .089 0 .648 
Corruption control 860 -.567 .62 -1.723 1.217 
Political Stability  881 -.359 1.165 -2.845 8.057 
Regulatory quality 881 -.417 1.33 -2.298 15.344 
Rule of Law 881 -.341 1.934 -2.13 21.196 
Voice 881 -.296 1.36 -1.859 16.337 
Gov. effectiveness 881 -.608 .621 -2.13 1.077 
 Note: Obs is Observation (N × T); Std. Dev. is Standard deviation 
Source: Authors’ construct, 2021 
 
The data also shows an average vulnerable employment value of 70.92 per cent, which is a 
clear indication of the precarious nature of employment in SSA. Quite revealing, we observe 
that all the governance indicators are below the average of zero. For instance, for our 
institutional feature of governance, we observe an average score of -0.56 and -0.34 for control 
of corruption and rule of law, respectively. Also, the average values of FDI10, inflation and 
ICT access are 2.89 per cent, 58.38 per cent and 2.17 per cent, respectively. The correlations 




                                               
10See the level of within-country FDI inflow to SSA over the study period in Figure A.4 
4.2 Preliminary results on social equity, economic integration and inclusive growth in SSA 
The presentation of our results begins with a test of the bivariate relationships between 
inclusive growth and the variables of interestFDI and the six governance indicators. The 
results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FDI 0.0191***       
 (0.0045)       
Corruption control  0.3223***      
  (0.0675)      
Political stability   0.1828***     
   (0.0463)     
Regulatory quality     0.1473**    
    (0.0639)    
Rule of law     0.0671*   
     (0.0384)   
Voice        0.0427  
      (0.0471)  
Gov. effectiveness       0.2088*** 
       (0.0341) 
Constant 4.9117*** 6.2886*** 5.7339*** 5.7935*** 5.7909*** 5.6191*** 3.9430*** 
 (0.0315) (0.1039) (0.0785) (0.1012) (0.0820) (0.0756) (0.2000) 
Observations 1,260 881 881 881 881 881 881 
R-squared 0.010 0.126 0.048 0.043 0.017 0.003 0.040 
Adj. R-Squared 0.009 0.121 0.045 0.035 0.011 -0.0007 0.039 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First, the results in Table 3 show that FDI has a strong positive relationship with inclusive 
growth. Second, with the exception of voice and accountability, all our governance indicators 
are statistically significant in driving inclusive growth in SSA. Albeit statistically 
insignificant, voice and accountability is positively related to inclusive growth. Our bivariate 
results indicate that controlling the prevalence and depth of corruption, and governance 
effectiveness are keys for governance modules in spurring shared prosperity in SSA.  
 
4.3 Effect of FDI and governance on inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa 
In this section, our main results on the effects of governance and FDI on inclusive growth in 
SSA based on the Anand et al. (2013) measure are presented. The effects of FDI and 
governance on inclusive growth are similar from the fixed effects estimator (see, Table A.2), 
random effects estimator (see, Table A.3), and the system GMM estimator in Table 4, which 
we provide next. Our baseline results in Column 1 of Table 4 show that despite moderate 
effects, both inflation and vulnerable employment are inimical to shared growth in SSA. 
However, we find that human capital development and financial development are inclusive 
growth-inducing. The magnitudes of the coefficients show that for every 1 per cent 
improvement in human capital and financial development of the region, inclusive growth is 
enhanced by a remarkable 0.86 per cent and 0.11 per cent, respectively. Though we do not 
find empirical significance for ICT access, the results show that it is positively associated 
with inclusive growth.  
Table 4: System GMM results on the effects of FDI and governance on inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Dependent variable: Inclusive growth) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inclusive growth (lag) 0.8068*** 0.8228*** 0.8430*** 0.8752*** 0.8667*** 0.8667*** 0.8615*** 0.8696*** 0.8094*** 0.8622*** 0.7972*** 0.8267*** 0.8314*** 0.8304*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0042) (0.0078) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0103) (0.0049) (0.0132) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0113) 
Vulnerable employment -0.0029*** -0.0028*** -0.0044*** -0.0023*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0022*** -0.0020*** -0.0033*** -0.0019*** -0.0027*** -0.0023*** -0.0021*** -0.0018** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Inflation  -0.0003*** -0.0010*** -0.0003*** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0002** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Human capital  0.8659*** 0.9335*** 0.1681 0.1539  0.4400***  0.6184**  0.3549** 0.3443  0.6173*** 0.4498*** 0.0561 0.1158 0.3195 0.4170 
 (0.2074) (0.3358) (0.4047) (0.1387) (0.0949) (0.2688) (0.1567) (0.3375) (0.0952) (0.0933) (0.3725) (0.2648) (0.4286) (0.3672) 
ICT access 0.0043 0.0015 0.0251*** 0.0143*** 0.0155*** 0.0199*** 0.0165*** -0.0002 0.0310*** 0.0168***  0.0261*** 0.0256*** 0.0143*** 0.0034 
 (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0042) (0.0050) 
Financial development  0.1104* 0.1114 0.1675* 0.1315** 0.0430 0.0268 0.0209 0.1768* 0.1077  0.1562* 0.1204 0.2146* 0.0407 0.0704 
 (0.0560) (0.1905) (0.0989) (0.0569) (0.0851) (0.0322) (0.0825) (0.1040) (0.1153) (0.0879) (0.0980) (0.1141) (0.0789) (0.0597) 
FDI  0.0252***        0.0238*** 0.0036***  0.0497***  0.0252***  0.0054** 0.0164*** 
  (0.0041)       (0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0012) 
Corruption control    0.2269**      -0.0118      
   (0.0949)      (0.0629)      
Political stability     0.0990***       0.0177*     
    (0.0158)      (0.0100)     
Regulatory quality      0.1451***      0.0181    
     (0.0156)      (0.0202)    
Rule of law       0.1512***       0.0200   
      (0.0131)      (0.0141)   
Voice        0.1195***      0.0387*  
       (0.0171)      (0.0220)  
Gov. effectiveness        0.0003***      0.0004*** 
        (0.0001)      (0.0001) 
FDI × Corruption control          0.0613***      
         (0.0056)      
FDI ×Political stability          0.0282***     
          (0.0023)     
FDI × Regulatory quality           0.0700***    
           (0.0061)    
FDI × Rule of law            0.0465***   
            (0.0033)   
FDI × Voice             0.0542***  
             (0.0037)  
FDI × Gov. effectiveness              0.0832*** 
              (0.0101) 
Constant 0.8443*** 0.6982*** 0.8156*** 0.7492*** 0.8239*** 0.9026*** 0.8815*** 0.5378*** 0.8412*** 0.5419*** 1.1882*** 0.9236*** 0.7544*** 1.0686*** 
 (0.1170) (0.1964) (0.1377) (0.0495) (0.0587) (0.1057) (0.0716) (0.1105) (0.0778) (0.0630) (0.1264) (0.0983) (0.1514) (0.1677) 
Observations 1,260 1,260 860 881 881 881 881 881 860 881 881 881 881 838 
Countries 42 42 41 42 42 42 42 42 41 42 42 42 42 42 
Instruments 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Net-effect –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   0.0993 –   –   0.1956 0.2411 
    Sign. Test Stats. [P-value] –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   7.34[0.012] –   –   5.93[0.019] 50.01[0.00] 
Wald statistic 375653  2.060e+07 88763 129923 2.130e+06 1.009e+06 1.009e+06 721707 52960 596023 590232 470950 80760 429089 
    Wald P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen P-Value 0.338 0.311 0.792 0.470 0.406 0.359 0.488 0.461 0.537 0.563 0.525 0.432 0.615 0.436 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 
AR(2) 0.662 0.683 0.250 0.184 0.235 0.135 0.179 0.160 0.270 0.173 0.171 0.244 0.127 0.803 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We shift focus to our first objective, which we find that both FDI and governance matter for 
inclusive growth in SSA. The results in Column 2 show that FDI inflow to SSA enhances 
shared prosperity by 0.02 per cent. The effect of FDI is modest and suggests that there are 
untapped avenues for FDI to contribute to the region’s quest for durable and equitable growth 
plausibly through investment, employment creation, foreign exchange, and revenue 
mobilization. These opportunities arise as FDI can (1) augment the region’s productive 
capacity, (2) revive the region’s floundering industries, and (3) spur technological transfer, 
innovation, and enhanced global value chain participation. The sheer optimism regarding our 
results on FDI is that conditions in SSA are fertile for natural resource-seeking, market-
seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking investors to profit and contribute to 
the region’s quest for industrialization, poverty alleviation and reduction of income equality. 
Also, our results in Columns 3 – 8 provide evidence on the relevance of governance in 
fostering inclusive growth in SSA. We find that our institutional governance measures of 
corruption control and rule of law are remarkable in spurring inclusive growth in SSA. The 
results indicate that while the latter induces shared prosperity by 0.15 per cent, the former 
enhances inclusive growth by 0.11 per cent. We reckon that for growth to be durable and 
equitable, quality institutional governance is needed to deliver the core functions of the 
State to address the region’s levels of poverty, income inequality and porous growth 
trajectories. It requires that States run on systems that are built to put the interest of all at 
handto protect property rights and ensure that public resources benefit society as a whole. 
Realizing this will rest on robust, transparent and politically-free legal systems and civil 
society that ensures the protection of the public purse, accountability of public officials, and 
the protection of the ordinary from arbitrary rules. On economic governance, we provide 
strong empirical evidence to show that for every 1 per cent improvement in regulatory 
quality, and governance effectiveness, the region enhances its inclusive growth gains by 0.08 
per cent and 0.04 per cent, respectively. The results suggest that if SSA can achieve high 
rates of shared income growth, there is the need to provide a conducive environment that 
does not stifle private sector growth and innovation. Prudent economic governance is also 
required to address inequality in opportunities, income, and wealth through the institution of 
robust social equity regimes that cushion vulnerable groups in society to realistically 
participate and gain from growth. Similarly, for our political governance indicators of 
political stability, and voice and accountability, we report a rise in inclusive growth of 0.01 
per cent and 0.09 per cent, respectively. One of the key drawbacks to durable shared growth 
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in SSA has been the geopolitical frailties of the region, fueled by a lack of concrete political 
framework that: (1) incorporates the concerns, freedoms, wills and opinions of the masses in 
decision-making, and (2) the tendency for incumbent governments to manipulate institutions 
to hold onto power. The added advantage of pursuing inclusive growth is that it can promote 
social cohesion/political stability if political landscapes are fair, non-oppressive and 
inclusive. 
For our second objective, we find that out of the three broad categories of 
governancepolitical, economic and institutional governance, only the first two engender 
positive synergy with FDI on inclusive growth in SSA (see, Columns 9 – 14). First, we find 
that, for every 1 per cent improvement in political stability, the power of FDI in fostering 
shared prosperity in SSA is enhanced by 0.09 per cent. Similarly, we report a net effect of 
0.19 per cent for the FDI and voice and accountability pathway (see, Column 13). These net 
effects are computed as follows taking into account the average FDI( 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅ ) inflow of 2.894. 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑙) = 0.0177 + (0.0282 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0177 + (0.0282 × 2.894) = 0.0993  
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒) = 0.0387 + (0.0542 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0387 + (0.0542 × 2.894) = 0.1956  
 
Second, from the calculations we provide next, it is evident that for our economic governance 
indicators of regulatory quality and governance effectiveness, only the latter forms a 
significant complementary channel with FDI on inclusive growth. The net effect of 0.24 per 
cent for this pathway is calculated as: 
 𝜕 𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)𝜕 𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑓) = 0.0004 + (0.0832 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0004 + (0.0832 × 2.894) = 0.2411  
 
Albeit statistically insignificant, the regulatory quality–FDI pathway is also positive, 
signifying inclusive-growth inducing potential if regulatory quality is improved upon. 
Finally, though the direction of the pathways for both rule of law–FDI, and control of 
corruption–FDI depicts a case of positive synergy on inclusive growth, statistical evidence 
eludes us. 
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The uniqueness of our results is that, out of the six economic integration and 
governance channels, only threethe governance effectiveness–FDI, the political stability–
FDI, and the voice and accountability–FDI channels are significant pathways to shared 
prosperity in SSA. The optimism regarding our findings is that, with FDI inflow to SSA 
expected to recover in 2022 (UNTAD 2020) in line with the AfCFTA, political stability, and 
governance effectiveness are crucial for sharing growth dividends. For the expected 
inclusivity potential of FDI to be realized, the effectiveness of the State in shaping markets, 
influencing investment opportunities, and building conducive macroeconomic atmosphere for 
the private sector to invest and innovate is crucial. Indeed, the governance effectiveness–FDI 
interaction term is the most pronounced pathway, signifying the need to build coordinated 
policy instruments and efficient economic administration that can ease the burden of foreign 
investors to grow and transform the informally predominant real sector of the region to an 
industrial one. This will require a strong policy framework, particularly, one that can manage 
and lessen the impact of market failures, financial and socioeconomic crises. Further, the 
slump in FDI inflow to the MENA following the Arab uprising in 2011 underscores the 
relevance/seriousness of our result on the FDI–political stability, and FDI–voice and 
accountability pathways. The concomitant positive synergy from both pathways on inclusive 
growth stems from the fact that freer legal systems, civil societies, media, and respect for 
rights and freedoms of people attract FDI as it (1) guarantees investments returns, and (2) 
eliminates politically coordinated/motivated interference in FDI-related innovation and 
growth. Finally, albeit not statistically significant, the sign of the interaction terms for our 
institutional governance indicators (control of corruption, rule of law) and FDI is one that is 
complementary in spurring shared prosperity in SSA. The results point to a case of weak 
institutional settings in SSA, signifying the need for the region to build systems with robust 
checks and balances. It also requires a legal framework that (1) punishes crimes and 
misappropriation of the public purse, and (2) safeguards investors and ensures that returns 
from investments accrue to their holders. 
The auxiliary findings are also in order a 1 per cent improvement in human capital 
development and ICT access boosts inclusive growth in SSA by 0.56 per cent and 0.006 per 
cent, respectively (see, Column 10). Indeed, the relevance of digital infrastructure and human 
capital in this information era is crucial for shared opportunities (see, Ofori and Asongu 
2021; Asongu and Odhiambo 2020). Be it in educational sector, civil service, financial 
service, trade and innovation, the power of ICTs is being leveraged to foster gender impartial 
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opportunities, ideation and inclusive governance. Though vulnerable employment and 
inflation are harmful to shared prosperity in SSA, the effects are modest. Finally, our results 
show that irrespective of the type of model specification, the lag of inclusive growth is strong 
in amplifying the effect of current year’s inclusive growth efforts. The appropriateness of the 
system GMM estimates lies in the satisfaction of a number of diagnostic tests, particularly the 
absence of proliferated instrument, (see Sargan P-values) and the absence of second-order 
serial correlation (see AR (2) statistics). 
 
4.4 Robustness checks for inclusive growth results 
We evaluate the robustness of our estimates in Table 4 by using a new measure of inclusive 
growth index generated via the PCA technique. We do so by following the recommendation 
of the Asian Development Bank (2013) on variables key for driving inclusive growth in the 
developing world. As we show in Table 5, we use a total of 12 variables taking into 
consideration the relevance of the real sector, energy supply, social transfers, and income 
growth and distribution in inclusive growth. 
 
Table 5: Variables used in constructing inclusive growth index 
Variable  Variable Definition Source 
Poverty headcount International poverty headcount (US$1.90) PED 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (US$’ 2017 PPP) WDI 
Social protection Effectiveness of institutions for social protection rating (1=low 
to 6=high) 
WDI 
Electricity access Electricity access (overall population) WDI 
Clean fuel Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking is the 
proportion of total population primarily using clean cooking 
fuels and technologies for cooking. 
WDI 
Gini Gini index  WDI 
Ease of doing Business Rule of law (estimate) WDI 
Health expenditure Government expenditure on health (%GDP) WDI 
Education expenditure Government expenditure on education (%GDP) WDI 
Wages/salaries Human Capital Index (HCI) (scale 0-1) WDI 
Labour force  Labour force participation rate total (% of total population ages 
15-64) 
WDI 
Under-5 Mortality Under-5 mortality per 1000 live births WDI 
Note: WDI is World Development Indicators; PED is Poverty and Equity Database. 
Source: Authors’ construct, 2021 
 
We present the eigenvalues of the 12 components of inclusive growth in Table 5 while 
highlighting the key components used in constructing the final index in Figure 4. Per the 
eigenvalue rule of at least 1 (Tchamyou et al. 2019b; Tchamyou, 2020), our inclusive growth 
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index is calculated based on the first three components, which cummulatively explain 62.5 
per cent information in our inclusive growth dataset (see results in Table A.4).   
 
 
Figure 4: Screeplot of Principal Components of Inclusive Growth 
 
4.4.1 Robustness check results based on inclusive growth index 
We begin the presentation of our results by paying particular attention to the baseline results 
in Table 6. The results as shown in Column 1 indicate that human capital, financial 
development, and ICT access are important drivers of inclusive growth in SSA.  The results 
however show that vulnerable employment and inflation are deleterious to inclusive growth 
efforts in SSA. We also find that irrespective of model specification type, the lag of inclusive 
growth is remarkable and statistically significant at 1 per cent, signifying the relevance of 
previous year’s inclusive growth momentum in current shared growth efforts. 
 21 
Table 6: System GMM results on the effects of FDI and governance on inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Dependent variable: Inclusive growth index) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inclusive growth index (lag) 1.0341*** 1.0330*** 1.0045*** 1.0412*** 1.0370*** 1.0357*** 1.0338*** 1.0224*** 1.0055*** 1.0376*** 1.0244*** 1.0325*** 1.0351*** 1.0180*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0023) 
Vulnerable employment  -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0010*** -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***  -0.0004***  -0.0005***  -0.0011***  -0.0009***  -0.0004***  -0.0004***  -0.0005***  -0.0005*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inflation   -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Human capital  0.1211*** 0.1288*** 0.0455*** 0.0499*** 0.3779*** 0.0814*** 0.1264*** 0.2207*** 0.0360** 0.0394** 0.3467*** 0.1048*** 0.1853*** 0.2202*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0274) (0.0062) (0.0092) (0.0085) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.0226) (0.0093) (0.0116) (0.0223) 
ICT access 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0007** 0.0042*** 0.0052*** 0.0010*** 0.0014*** 0.0062*** 0.0005 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 0.0015*** 0.0025*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Financial development  0.0157*** -0.0067 0.0886*** 0.0378*** 0.1523*** 0.0331*** 0.0914*** 0.0742*** 0.0815*** 0.0615*** 0.1004*** 0.0157** 0.0818*** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0080) (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0054) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0134) (0.0086) (0.0062) (0.0092) (0.0103) 
FDI  0.0012***       0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0034*** 0.0003*** 0.0019*** 0.0022*** 
  (0.0001)       (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Corruption control      0.1091***      0.1167***      
   (0.0048)      (0.0056)      
Political Stability     0.0617***      0.0601***     
    (0.0088)      (0.0075)     
Regulatory quality      0.1113***      0.0891***    
     (0.0031)      (0.0028)    
Rule of law      0.0232***      0.0261***   
      (0.0023)      (0.0036)   
Voice        0.0426***      0.0539***  
       (0.0025)      (0.0034)  
Gov. effectiveness         0.0002***      0.0002*** 
        (0.0000)      (0.0000) 
FDI× Corruption control          0.0004*      
         (0.0002)      
FDI×Political stability          0.0013***     
          (0.0002)     
FDI× Regulatory quality           0.0071***    
           (0.0005)    
FDI× Rule of law            0.0020***   
            (0.0002)   
FDI× Voice             0.0010***  
             (0.0003)  
FDI× Gov. effectiveness              0.0131*** 
              (0.0008) 
Constant 0.0272*** 0.0288*** 0.0064 -0.0335*** -0.0657*** -0.0271*** -0.0341*** 0.1200*** 0.0083 -0.0260*** -0.0702*** -0.0291*** -0.0507*** 0.0631*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0073) (0.0097) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0092) 
Observations 1,260 1,260 860 881 881 881 881 881 860 881 881 881 881 838 
Countries     42 42 41 42 42 42 42 42 41 42 42 42 42 42 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Net-effect    –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   0.1178 0.0638 0.1096 0.0318 0.0568 0.0381 
     Sign. Test Stats [P-value] –   –   –   –   –   –   –   –   5.88[0.022] 1531.0[0.00] 3.67[0.073] 6.17[0.024] 3.56[0.077] 556.4[0.00] 
Wald statistic 6.119e+06 8.217e+06 362866 635833 1.809e+06 2.765e+06 1.350e+07 5.806e+06 91094 278643 847437 3.396e+06 2.438e+06 1.068e+06 
     Wald P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen P-Value 0.557 0.382 0.535 0.438 0.458 0.388 0.499 0.487 0.499 0.401 0.399 0.306 0.554 0.350 
AR(1) 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.038 0.021 0.033 0.040 0.034 0.026 0.031 0.017 0.026 0.038 0.027 
AR(2) 0.313 0.342 0.729 0.370 0.932 0.124 0.115 0.323 0.793 0.517 0.120 0.167 0.113 0.150 
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Similar to our results in Table 4, we find strong empirical evidence for our first hypothesis 
(see Columns 2 – 8). The results show that for every 1 per cent increase in FDI inflow to 
SSA, inclusive growth is enhanced by a modest 0.001 per cent (see, Column 2). Indeed, the 
recent momentum of the region has partly been attributed to a quick rebound of FDI into the 
region after the 2008/09 global financial meltdown (see, UNCTAD 2019). With FDI inflow 
into SSA set to rebound following the coming into for the AfCFTA and the finalization of the 
African investment protocol, our results provide real optimism on how policymakers can use 
trade to provide shared opportunities for teaming the youthful population of the region. This 
calls for deliberate efforts in building the region’s forward and backward linkages, which can 
put the youthful and innovative workforce to work, boost productivity and enhance the 
region’s global value chain participation. Further, we provide strong evidence irrespective of 
the type of model specification to show that political, institutional, and economic governance 
matter for inclusive growth in SSA. In specifics, we find that for every 1 per cent 
improvement in political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law, inclusive growth rises 
by 0.06 per cent (Column 4), 0.11 per cent (Column 5), and 0.02 (Column 6) per cent, 
respectively. The relevance of voice and accountability, and the fight against corruption are 
also telling as 1 per cent improvement in these governance indicators fosters shared 
prosperity in SSA by 0.04 per cent (Column 7) and 0.1 per cent (Column 3), respectively.  
We find empirical evidence for our second hypothesis as well. As the results in 
Columns 9 – 14 indicate, irrespective of the type of model specification, FDI is a 
complementary pathway through which all our governance mechanisms spur inclusive 
growth in SSA. First, we report a net effect of 0.06 per cent and 0.05per cent for political 
stability, and voice and accountability, respectively. These net effects are calculated based on 
average FDI inflow of 2.893 as follows: 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑙) = 0.0601 + (0.0013 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) =  0.0601 + (0.0013 × 2.894) = 0.0638 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒) = 0.0539 + (0.0010 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0539 + (0.0010 × 2.894) = 0.0568 
 
Second, on economic governance, we find that FDI enhances the inclusive growth effects of 
regulatory quality and governance effectiveness in SSA. While we find a net effect of 0.11 
per cent for the former, the latter shows a net effect of 0.04 per cent on inclusive growth.  
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𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑒𝑔) = 0.0891 + (0.0071 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0891 + (0.0071 × 2.894) = 0.1096 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑓) = 0.0002 + (0.0131 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0002 + (0.0131 × 2.894) = 0.0381 
 
Finally, we now find empirical support for the FDI-institutional governance pathway to 
inclusive growth. In specifics, we find a net effect of 0.11 per cent for the control of 
corruption and FDI interaction and 0.03 per cent for the rule of law and FDI interaction term.  
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡) = 0.1167 + (0.0004 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.1167 + (0.0004 × 2.894) = 0.1178 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑔𝑔)𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑜𝑙) = 0.0261 + (0.0020 × 𝑓𝑑𝑖̅̅̅̅̅) = 0.0261 + (0.0020 × 2.894) = 0.0318 
 
For the controls, the results show that while both vulnerable employment and inflation 
suppress inclusive growth efforts, human capital, ICT access and financial development 
induce shared prosperity. Particularly, the result on ICT access is positive but weak, implying 
that channeling resources to boost the regions digital infrastructure can create shared 
opportunities and wealth that can reverberate throughout the region. Albeit moderate effects, 
our results on vulnerable employment and inflation mean that sustaining durable growth 
trajectories can be hampered by macroeconomic mismanagement and precarious 
employment. 
 
5.0 Conclusion, policy recommendations and future research directions 
This study contributes to the debate on how policy makers in SSA can foster shared 
prosperity. We do so by examining the effect of FDI and several governance dynamics on 
inclusive growth. We test two main hypotheses first, whether FDI and three governance 
indicators (economic, political, and institutional) matter for inclusive growth in SSA, and (2) 
whether FDI is effective in modulating the effect of our governance indicators on inclusive 
growth in SSA. We draw on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, Poverty and Equity Database, and the Global 
Consumption and Income Project for the period 1990 – 2020 for the analysis. 
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The results show that: (1) FDI and all our governance dynamics are crucial for building 
shared growth in SSA; and (2) though FDI amplifies the effects of our governance dynamics 
on inclusive growth in SSA, that of control of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law 
are weak. Particularly, the remarkable mechanism of governance effectiveness, political 
stability, and voice and accountability on inclusive growth implies that sharing potential 
gains of FDI will rest more of building open and transparent institutions of high standards 
and integrity to make resources count for all. 
 Also, we recommend governments, multilateral and non-governmental institutions 
(like the World Bank and Africa Development Bank) to provide leadership and assistance in 
building a vibrant socioeconomic framework/mechanism that ensures social equity. Further, 
riding at the back of FDI to foster shared growth will require policymakers mapping out 
strategies that create shared wealth by enhancing technical and vocational education. Finally, 
going forward, incentivizing and spurring shared prosperity through FDI in SSA will require 
particular attention to strengthening the effectiveness of legal regimes and the fight against 
corruption.  
 The study obviously leaves room for further research especially within the remit of 
engaging country-specific studies in order to provide more country-oriented policies that are 
more adapted to the initial development conditions of respective countries. This future 
research direction builds on the premise that while the panel evidence provided in this study 
is relevant for cross-country common policy harmonization, more targeted or country-
oriented policies should be informed by the relevant time series empirical strategies.  
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Figure A.1: FDI – Inclusive Growth Nexus
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Figure A.2: Governance – Inclusive Growth Nexus
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*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Inclusive growth 1             
(2) FDI 0.0418 1            
(3) Vulnerable employment -0.263*** 0.0402 1           
(4) Inflation -0.0729* 0.0633 -0.0360 1          
(5) Human capital 0.253*** -0.0162 -0.268*** 0.00378 1         
(6) ICT access 0.228*** 0.0614 -0.460*** -0.0217 0.672*** 1        
(7) Financial development 0.155*** 0.0211 -0.600*** 0.0652 0.405*** 0.623*** 1       
(8) Corruption control 0.0958** 0.0428 -0.531*** -0.0405 0.367*** 0.598*** 0.529*** 1      
(9) Governance effectiveness 0.154*** 0.0685* -0.257*** -0.0126 0.165*** 0.429*** 0.407*** 0.104** 1     
(10) Political Stability 0.182*** 0.0675* -0.433*** -0.0174 0.374*** 0.497*** 0.336*** 0.715*** -0.0150 1    
(11) Regulatory quality 0.135*** -0.0770* -0.512*** 0.0101 0.371*** 0.518*** 0.566*** 0.757*** -0.0339 0.646*** 1   
(12) Rule of law 0.131*** -0.0126 -0.560*** 0.0226 0.441*** 0.629*** 0.543*** 0.882*** -0.0973 0.782*** 0.853*** 1  
(13) Voice 0.0443 0.0450 -0.491*** -0.0111 0.326*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 0.760*** 0.0283 0.729*** 0.721*** 0.814*** 1 
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Table A.2: Fixedeffectresults on the effects of FDI and governance on inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Dependent variable: Inclusive growth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Vulnerable employment      -0.0111    -0.0135* -0.0274** -0.0192 -0.0568 -0.0324*   -0.0542*** -0.0490*** -0.0262** -0.0139 -0.0633* -0.0323** -0.0534*** -0.0443*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0111) (0.0183) (0.0381) (0.0175) (0.0138) (0.0076) (0.0111) (0.0177) (0.0337) (0.0153) (0.0134) (0.0078) 
Inflation    -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0011** -0.0022*** -0.0018* -0.0009 -0.0015* 0.0001 -0.0011** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
Human capital 0.1090 0.2359 1.8115*** 1.6151** 2.0592 2.0691*** 0.8576 0.3050 1.5015*** 1.6490** 2.2626* 2.1037*** 0.7813 0.4278 
 (0.8028) (0.8008) (0.4984) (0.8087) (1.4955) (0.7147) (0.6921) (0.5597) (0.5492) (0.7828) (1.3119) (0.6374) (0.6711) (0.5636) 
ICT access 0.0174* 0.0165* 0.0157 0.0202 0.0229 0.0150 0.0063 0.0132 0.0193 0.0158 0.0312 0.0117 0.0027 0.0002 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0213) (0.0295) (0.0153) (0.0169) (0.0192) (0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0261) (0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0190) 
Financial development  0.0413 0.1773 0.5051 1.6890*  1.5552**  1.7572***  1.1247*   1.4845***    0.4335    1.3975  1.2627**  1.4759***  0.9686*  1.3953** 
 (0.4885) (0.4883) (0.4222) (0.9142) (0.6757) (0.6278) (0.5907) (0.5482) (0.4251) (0.8869) (0.5999) (0.5534) (0.5735) (0.5563) 
FDI  0.0130***       0.0085 0.0315*** 0.0162 0.0009 0.0060 0.0113*** 
  (0.0037)       (0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0251) (0.0109) (0.0063) (0.0033) 
Corruption control   0.1292***      0.1488***      
   (0.0347)      (0.0380)      
Political stability    0.0572      0.0017     
    (0.0418)      (0.0422)     
Regulatory quality     0.0934      0.0259    
     (0.0765)      (0.0687)    
Rule of law       0.0568      0.0258   
      (0.0457)      (0.0404)   
Voice         0.1978***      0.1359***  
       (0.0493)      (0.0502)  
Gov. effectiveness        0.0596**      0.1704*** 
        (0.0282)      (0.0366) 
FDI × Corruption control         0.0275      
         (0.0219)      
FDI × Political stability          0.0610***     
          (0.0134)     
FDI × Regulatory quality           0.0521***    
           (0.0114)    
FDI × Rule of law            0.0344***   
            (0.0051)   
FDI × Voice             0.0454***  
             (0.0112)  
FDI × Gov. effectiveness              0.1145*** 
              (0.0220) 
Constant 3.9753*** 3.7477*** 4.6338*** 6.4665*** 2.8193* 4.0070*** 2.4812*** 1.6082*** 4.8922*** 6.1838*** 2.6017* 4.0819*** 2.6478*** 1.9172*** 
 (0.6253) (0.6263) (0.5273) (1.1426) (1.6042) (0.8881) (0.8373) (0.6054) (0.5601) (1.1090) (1.4157) (0.7762) (0.8130) (0.6147) 
Observations 1,260 1,260 159 306 119 174 248 881 159 306 119 174 248 838 
R-squared 0.0197 0.0273 0.2360 0.0384 0.1129 0.1648 0.1796 0.0889 0.2472 0.1066 0.3314 0.3747 0.2372 0.1302 
Number of id 42 42 12 27 12 15 17 42 12 27 12 15 17 42 
Hausman Statistic 26.99 29.48 26.09 9.95 22.85 18.02 165.18 72.65 24.22 8.38 3.44 6.81 105.98 53.28 
Hausman [P-Values] 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.1267 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.3968 0.9037 0.5570 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A.3: Random effectsresults on the effects of FDI and governance on inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Dependent variable: Inclusive growth)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Vulnerable employment -0.0131*** -0.0127*** -0.0023 -0.0199*** -0.0093 -0.0092* -0.0062 -0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0184*** -0.0040 -0.0060 -0.0054 -0.0067* 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0118) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0116) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0039) 
Inflation  0.0017*** 0.0014*** -0.0031*** -0.0017* -0.0010 -0.0024*** -0.0010 -0.0020*** -0.0029*** -0.0022** -0.0017 -0.0026*** -0.0013 -0.0020*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
Human capital 1.5994** 1.6806** 2.1674*** 1.9963*** 3.0402** 2.9531*** 1.1927* 0.8781 1.9300*** 1.9827*** 3.0707*** 2.7470*** 1.0787 0.9814* 
 (0.6901) (0.6909) (0.5154) (0.7538) (1.2292) (0.6986) (0.7068) (0.5540) (0.5563) (0.7333) (1.1095) (0.6299) (0.6847) (0.5544) 
ICT access 0.0259*** 0.0247*** 0.0032 0.0154 0.0311 0.0173 0.0361*** 0.0456*** -0.0007 0.0165 0.0362* 0.0116 0.0403*** 0.0485*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0158) (0.0227) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0210) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0132) 
Financial development 0.1253 0.0187    0.3275   1.2664  1.5980** 1.0036 0.7723  1.2034** 0.3204 -1.0547  1.3272**  1.0202* 0.5670 1.0391* 
 (0.4705) (0.4706) (0.4432) (0.8319) (0.6695) (0.6324) (0.6165) (0.5354) (0.4436) (0.8146) (0.5990) (0.5634) (0.5971) (0.5391) 
FDI  0.0116***       0.0036 0.0304*** 0.0120 0.0020 0.0072 0.0128*** 
  (0.0036)       (0.0113) (0.0093) (0.0251) (0.0113) (0.0069) (0.0034) 
Corruption control   0.1289***      0.1411***      
   (0.0363)      (0.0398)      
Political stability    0.0341      0.0198     
    (0.0399)      (0.0408)     
Regulatory quality     0.0970      0.0304    
     (0.0727)      (0.0668)    
Rule of law      0.0329      0.0057   
      (0.0397)      (0.0374)   
Voice          0.1514***      0.0720  
       (0.0479)      (0.0490)  
Gov. effectiveness        0.0732**      0.2167*** 
        (0.0287)      (0.0366) 
FDI × Corruption control         0.0173      
         (0.0227)      
FDI × Political stability          0.0603***     
          (0.0134)     
FDI × Regulatory quality           0.0533***    
           (0.0115)    
FDI × Rule of law            0.0349***   
            (0.0054)   
FDI × Voice             0.0521***  
             (0.0122)  
FDI × Gov. effectiveness              0.1433*** 
              (0.0221) 
Constant 5.1173*** 5.0584*** 5.1973*** 5.9907*** 5.2013*** 4.9889*** 5.0158*** 4.9298*** 5.2830*** 5.9826*** 5.0970*** 5.0751*** 5.1662*** 5.0344*** 
 (0.4076) (0.4092) (0.3998) (0.5208) (0.9363) (0.4373) (0.4682) (0.4111) (0.4452) (0.5278) (0.8891) (0.4490) (0.4324) (0.4109) 
Observations 1,050 1,050 159 306 119 174 248 881 159 306 119 174 248 838 




Table A.4: Principal components eigenvectors (Inclusive growth index) 
Component   Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
PC 1      4.417     2.606     0.368     0.368 
PC 2      1.811     0.532     0.151     0.519 
PC 3      1.279     0.321     0.107     0.625 
PC 4      0.958     0.085     0.080     0.705 
PC 5       0.873     0.240     0.073     0.778 
PC 6      0.633     0.049     0.053     0.831 
PC 7       0.584     0.130     0.049     0.880 
PC 8      0.454     0.083     0.038     0.917 
PC 9          0.371     0.095     0.031     0.948 
PC 10       0.276     0.081     0.023     0.971 
PC 11       0.196     0.047     0.016     0.988 
PC 12       0.148 .     0.012     1.000 
Note: PC is Principal Component 
Source: Authors’ construct, 2021 
 
 
 
